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Maczek: 1st Polish Armoured Division

The 1st Polish Armoured
Division in Normandy
Major-General Stanislaw Maczek

Editor’s note: The 1st Polish Armoured Division fought side-by-side with the Canadians during the
Normandy Campaign. The Division was formed in England in early 1942 mainly from Poles who
had fled the German occupation of their country in 1939. On 30 July 1944 the Division arrived
in Normandy where it was placed under the command of Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds’ 2nd
Canadian Corps. Its first introduction to battle came on 7 August during the battles south of Caen.
The report reproduced below constitutes the afteraction report of the 1st Polish Armoured Division
for it operations in Normandy. This report forms the basis of many accounts of the Division and
deserves to be read in its original, unedited form.

13 August 1944,
Operational Report
Commanding Officer,
1st Polish Armoured Division

Fighting During the Period from
7-12 August 1944
MAP REF: 1:50,000 Caen Falaise
Sheets 7F/2 and 7F/6.

Task of 1 Polish Armd Div
To by-pass the 51 (H) Div. To attack and seize the
area of Hills 170 and 159, N [north] of Falaise and
from there to carry out recce [reconnaissance]
patrols in the arc made by the Falaise - Argentan
(included) and the Mont-Boint (1446) – Condesur-Ifs (1952) rds (excluded).
Intention

Organization of Fighting
On 7 August 1944 at 0500 hours 1st Polish
Armoured Division became attached to and at the
disposal of 2nd Canadian Corps (Commanding
Officer Lieutenant-General Simonds) which
included 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions,
4th Cdn Armd Div, and 51st Highland Division.

Task to be executed in two phases:
First Phase: The Armd Bde [Brigade] to seize first
objective (area S of Estrée la Campagne and the
Hill 140 (1347)). Rifle Bde was to form a pivot
in the area of Cauvicourt.

Task of 2 Cdn Corps

Second Phase: Rifle Bde was to change over with
the Armd Bde, which was to attack the second
objective (area of Hills 170 & 159 N of Falaise).

To attack in the general direction of Falaise and
to break open the hinge S [south] of Caen, then
to exploit the use of 4 Cdn Armd Div on Falaise
and 1 Pol Armd Div on the crossings of the River
Dives in a South-Easterly direction.

Total operation to be covered by reinforced 10
Mounted Rifle Regt from the E [east] in order to
maintain closest contact with 4 Cdn Armd Div
in the W [west].
51
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Method
10 Mounted Rifle Regt less one sqn, reinforced
by one A [Anti] Tk [Tank] Bty [Battery] SP 17pdr received the task to reconnoitre and cover
the left flank of Div, according to special order,
after leading regts of Armd Bde had crossed the
rd Bretteville-le Rabet – St. Sylvain. Further,
execution of marching orders as Attack Order
No.1.
Development of Military Operations
Night march on 7/8 August 1944 and activity
on 8 August 1944

The march was executed by two columns from
former positions:
10 Armd Cavalry Bde (from area Buchot)
3 Rifle Bde (from area Magny)
Arty (from area Meuvaines)
Div Tps and Div HQ (from area Sommervieu)

Leading Bde - 10 Armd Cavalry Bde in complete
formation:
1 Mech Arty Regt.
One A Tk Bty
One AA Bty, less two troops
8 Rifle Bn from 3 Rifle Bde

Major-General Stanislaw Maczek, commander of 1st Polish Armoured Division, and his staff talking to war correspondents
at Amblie, Normandy, 7 August 1944. From left to right: L.S.B. Shapiro, North American Newspaper Alliance; Ralph
Allen, Globe & Mail; and J.A.M. Cook, Winnipeg Free Press; Captain T.A. Wysocki, Colonel K. Dworak and Maczek.
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1st Polish Armoured Division
10 Light Med Coy
10 Sap Coy

Att to Bde, 22 Brit Dragoons, equiped with Antimine tanks (Crab-type).
On 7 Aug 44, at 1800 hours the columns
were formed; at 0230 hours the fwd [forward]
elements of the bde reached the start line. The
bde, marching on the Red axis was followed by
the Adv Div HQ and 3 Rifle Bde, less 8 Rifle Bn
[Battalion], reinf by: 2 Mech [Mechanized] Arty
[Artillery] Regt [Regiment]; two A Tk Btys; one
AA [Anti-Aircraft] Bty 11 Coy Engrs [Engineers]
(less one platoon); 11 Medical Coy.
Div HQ marched as fourth echelon and
Quartermaster Group as fifth echelon.
By 0630 hours the leading elements of 10
Armd Cav Bde reached the designated area –
the bridges S of Caen. 3 Rifle Bde reached the
bridges between 1300 and 1400 hours, the Div
HQ between 1400 and 1500 hours.
The route was traced and controlled by Polish
and British Traffic Control.
During the march tps [troops] encountered
several difficulties, namely: poor roads for
vehs [vehicles], clouds of dust which rendered
forward cars invisible to the drivers, in a drive
without lights, rds so narrow that only jeeps and
motorcycles could overtake.
Generally speaking the march was efficiently
executed – in spite of an exceptional concentration
of troops in this area.
The distance covered in the march was nearly 30
kilometres. The 10 Armd Cav Bde reaches Bras
by 0800 hours. After breakfast, the echelons A 1
and A 2 were left in Bras and the Bde regrouped
for the march to the forming up place.
Here the 22 Brit Dragoons joined the bde. The
attack was to be preceded by the bombardment
by 21 A Gp Air Force, after which an arty barrage
was to be laid on enemy positions. At 1330
hours, the Air Force started the bombardment
but, probably by mistake, instead of bombing the
area of Cauvicourt–St. Sylvain, bombed the area
S of Caen, just as the Div HQ, as fourth echelon
arrived at its appointed place.

Divisional Command Group
Headquarters
No.4 Liaison HQ (British)
10th Mounted Rifles Regiment (reconnaissance)
10th Armoured Cavalry Brigade
1st Armoured Regiment
2nd Armoured Regiment
24th Lancer Regiment
10th Dragoon Regiment (motor battalion)
3rd Rifle Brigade
Podhole Rifle Battalion, 1st (Highland) Battalion
8th Rifle Battalion
9th Rifle Battalion
Divisional Artillery
1st Motorized Artillery Regiment
2nd Motorized Artillery Regiment
1st Anti-Tank Regiment
1 Anti-Aircraft Regiment
Divisional Engineers
10th Engineer Company
11th Engineer Company
1st Bridging Platoon
1st Field Park Company
1st Signals Battalion
Supply and Transport Troops
Medical Troops

As a result of this bombardment, the Cdn AGRA
suffered most, losing a great number of men
and much eqpt, but our AA Arty also lost 44
men (killed and wounded). The situation was
extremely difficult as the area was packed with
various munition dumps which exploded for 40
minutes after the bombing as a result of fires
caused. At 1335 hours 24 Lancers and 2 Tk
Regt, each reinforced by one sqn [squadron] of
Dragoons, one sqn of Crabs, and one platoon of
Engineers, started the attack as leading regts. At
1425 hours, 2 Tk Regt was stopped in attack by
twenty German tks, probably of German Tiger
type and Mk IV, operating from area 108556.
24 Lancers were under enemy arty fire. The
CO 10 Armd Cavalry Bde required arty on the
discovered targets.
53
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Our arty, very efficiently and
quickly supported 2 Tk Regt.
After all day fighting, the armd
regts set out for the night bivouac.
3 Rifle Bde took over the sector
and protected it for the night (the
Bde was to execute a night attack,
which was not realized).
The losses inflicted on the enemy
by 10 Armd Cavalry Bde in this
day were:
Prisoners – 1 offr, 105 ORs
Tanks – 1 MK IV, 5 Mk V destroyed
or damaged.
2 – 88 mm A Tk guns destroyed.
1 – 75 mm gun damaged
4 – 20 mm guns destroyed, 3
damaged.

Map drawn by Mike Bechthold ©2006

1 – 105 mm gun destroyed

At 1450 hours, two Arty Regts opened fire with
good results. At 1520 hours contact with 4 Cdn
Armd Div was established at the co-ordinate
082558. In that time, 2 Tk Regt fell into a very
difficult situation, its flank being menaced by
German tks. The CO Bde, arrived with help,
covering the flank with 2 Sqn, 10 Mounted Rifle
Regt and with one A Tk Bty.

6 – mortars (15 cm) destroyed
7 – Hy MG destroyed.
2 – Hy MG damaged.

General Remarks concerning 8
August 44
The ground was difficult for an
attack by the armour, having
several small woods and high
hedges. In spite of fairly distant
horizons, the ground was very
favourable for the enemy’s A Tk
defence.

The enemy was not sufficiently
neutralized by our own Air Force
and arty, so that the bde could
attack without heavy losses
(unfortunately the air force passed
through our own forces, destroying
not only a part of the arty, but also
the ammunition dumped for AGRA).
There was a constant threat to the left flank,
which will be henceforth a menace to the div ops
and my permanent worry.
The Crab regt was almost unemployed, since we
did not find any minefields.
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9 August 1944 – During the night of 8/9 August,
3 Rifle Bde prepared itself for the attack, but did
not carry it out, as the enemy withdrew, and after
only short fighting, reached the SE boundaries
of woods Robertmesnil, taking
48 prisoners. Our losses were
insignificant. At 0700 hours, 10
Armd Cavalry Bde were moved to
new area (N Cramesnil) 083570.
Between 0900 – 1000 hours, a
conference of COs was held and
the orders for a further move
were given.

St. Sylvain, but when it was discovered that St.
Sylvain was occupied by a strong enemy force
with the support of hy mortars and arty, the task
of capturing it was given to the Mountain Rifle

24 Lancers were given the task
of seizing the grove 1152 – La
Croise and of the wood S 1249. 1
Tk Regt plus one A Tk Bty had to
take 140 (130478) Cauvicourt–
Rénemesnil and cover itself by
the A Tk Bty from E. 2 Tk Regt
was in res behind 24 Lancers.
10 Dragoons between 2 Tk Regt
and 24 Lancers had the task
consolidating the ground seized
by the tk regts.
Arty was to support the
operations of the bde as far as
the R. Laison. Engrs with the
reserve regt, were at the disposal
of the CO 10 Armd Cavalry Bde.
Starting hour 1100 hours.
10 Mounted Rifle Regt, which very
successfully and courageously
reconnoitred St. Sylvain, was
released by 8 Rifle Bn, which
received the order to occupy
and to organize the defence of

Top: Members of the 2nd Armoured
Regiment waiting in the concentration
area, Cintheaux, 8 August 1944.
Middle: A Sherman V of the 1st
Armoured Regiment in an assembly
area, August 1944.
Bottom: Anti-Aircraft troop with the
forward command element of the 24th
Lancer Regiment, 8 August 1944.
Photos courtesy John R. Grodzinski
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M-10s of the 1st Anti-Tank Regiment firing onto German positions, August 1944.

Bn, which reinforced 8 Rifle Bn.
Between 1220 and 1255 hours, 1 Tk Regt reached
the W outlets of Cauvicourt and 24 Lancers the
grove 110520.
In the foreground appeared several times tks of
Tiger type, numbering 10 to 15 against which the
regts were fighting suffering loses.
About 1600 hours 1 Tk Regt captured Hill 84,
distinguishing itself in this fighting.
24 Lancers seized the NW boundary of la Croix,
1149.
For the night, 9 Rifle Bn took over Cauvicourt
from 10 Armd Cavalry Bde. At 1930 hours, the
Mountain Rifle Bn started to attack St. Sylvain.
The action was preceded by heavy bombardment
by arty and Air Force. By 2200 hours St. Sylvain
was occupied up to the area incl the church, and
by 2400 hours St. Martin de Bois was also taken.
The enemy losses were:
Prisoners – 3 offrs, 77 ORs.
Destroyed – 4 tks Mk IV, 1 Tk Mk V and 1 Tk
Mk VI.
Damaged – 1 tk Mk VI
Destroyed – 3 75 mm guns
Damaged – 3 75 mm guns
Destroyed – 4 22 mm A Tk guns, 8 15cm
Mortars, 2 Hy MGs.

During the day of 9 Aug, I received the order to
hand over the sector to 51 (H) Div, and to move
my div.
10 August 1944: After midnight, began the relief
of the Mountain Rifle Bn by the units of 51 (H)

Div. The Mountain Rifle Bn moved to the region
of Rénemesnil, 9 Rifle Bn, which passed under
the comd of C.O. 10 Armd Cavalry Bde moved
to the area of Soignolles.
10 Dragoons carried out a night attack on Estrées
la Campagne, receiving with 9 Rifle Bn a task to
reconnoitre.
At 1055 hours the enemy launched a counterattack from the area 140525 against 9 Rifle
Bn. The counter-attack was repulsed. During
this action the A Tk Bty distinguished itself.
At 1530 hours the C.O., 3 Rifle Bde received
the order to attack the area of hill 140111 (E
and S of Estrées la Campagne) and to seize
the brhead [bridgehead] on the R Laison at
Montboint and Rouvres. Simultaneously, 9 Rifle
Bn attacked, seized and maintained the horizon
E of Soignolles.
At 1520 hours, another German counter-attack
developed on the spot height 83 (128500). It was
repulsed with the help of AGRA fire.
At night, the situation of the leading units was E of
Soignolles and Estrées la Campagne. During the
day of 10 Aug, 9 Rifle Bn worked well, repulsing
several attacks of the enemy and maintaining its
positions. The Dragoons also did well, and had
excellent support from the A Tk units.
11 August 1944: On 11 Aug 44, the div remained
in its assigned area and maintained Soignolles
and Estrées la Campagne.
During the day, I received orders to attack and clr
up with one bn the whole wood of Quesnay. The
Corps Comd, decided later that this area should
be attacked by 3 Cdn Inf Div. I received instead,
the task of forming a special group for operational
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Photos courtesy John R. Grodzinski

Right: Officers of the 1st Motorized Artillery Regiment
make a final review of plans, August 1944.

General Characteristics of 1 Polish Armd
Divsion’s Operations During the Period 7-12
Aug 44.

reconnoitring of the areas la Bû sur Rouvres,
Ernes and Ifs-sur-Laison. This reconnaissance
was to be carried out for the Corps.

Marches to the battle:

During the day, the Germans launched several
counter-attacks against Estrées la Campagne and
Soignolles, all of which were repulsed, and the
tps maintained their positions.
12 Aug 44: (until 1200 hours). At night units of
1 Pol Armd Div were relieved by 3 Cdn Inf Div,
in area Estrées la Campagne and Soignolles. The
relief was completed at 0500 hours.
The Div passed to the res in Cramesnil la Bruyére.
3 Rifle Bde was in the woods S of Cramesnil
090555 with 1 A Tk Regt, (less two Btys) and 11
Engr Coy. 10 Armd Cav Bde in area St. Sylvain
(W) Cauvicourt – Rénemesnil. Div HQ unchanged
081571. Recce Group of Major Maciejowski (10
Mounted Rifles, 1 A Tk Bty SP and one Mech
Arty Bty SP) reconnoitred La Bû sur Rouvres
and area N and S of this locality. Between 1100
and 1230 hours the recce group established that
the enemy is occupying La Bû sur Rouvres by inf
(987 Inf Regt) and supposedly also by A Tk guns
on the flanks of this formation (2 88 mm guns).
The group received fire from two to three German
tks in a hull-down position from area 150508.
Another sqn was under A Tk fire. As a result of
this fire, four tks were lost (set on fire), one tk
damaged on a mine. At 1200 hours the recce gp
still reconnoitres.

(a) The first factor to note was the great
accumulation of Allied tps operating in Normandy.
From this fact resulted immense difficulty in the
execution of movements and in the disposition
of tps and rear units in assigned areas. There
was also the menace of the enemy Air Force and
arty fire. (Unfortunately, equally from the Allied
Air Force).
After leaving Caen, the div moved on certain
sectors cross-country. The CO Div Engrs was
forced repeatedly to prepare and maintain the
rds.
(b) The ops resembled the West Front fighting
in the war of 1918; but the attacking forces had
more liberty of action, considering the strong
superiority of our Air Force and arty.
(c) The ground was not quite as shown by maps
of France which have been supplied, having more
woods and particularly bushes, which was very
cunningly exploited by the enemy.

Photo by M.M. Dean, LAC PA 129202

Above: A SP 40 mm AA (Bofors) Morris-Commerical C9/B
of the 1st Anti-Aircraft Regiment, Normandy, August 1944

With his perfect camouflage, it made a great
difference to us.
(d) The enemy operated with individual battle
groups (Kampfgruppe) composed by inf, A Tk
arty, hy Inf weapons, and a few tks of Tiger,
Panther or Mk IV type. These groups held the
regions suitable for A Tk defence and their
strength and composition varied according to
the size of these regions.
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1 Pol Armd Div fought with the following identified
enemy units during the whole period 7-12 Aug;
the 89 Inf Div (arrived direct from Norway five
days before our engagement). In the days 8-10
Aug with 12 SS Panzer Div “Hitlerjugend”, with
101 Hy Tk Bn, belonging to the 1 SS Corps (at
Robertmesnil) and with the 272 Inf Div (at Bû
sur Rouvres).

enemy strength and the progress made (10
kilometres of heavy struggle) are not important.

In the days 10 and 11 Aug, with the group
“Waldmuller” (at Robertmesnil) and with 85 Inf
Div (which arrived recently from Germany and on
the day of 11 Aug was identified on our sector).

On 11 Aug, all objectives have been maintained.
On 12 Aug a special group reconnoitred La Bû
sur Rouvres.

The enemy fought stubbornly. The SS units are
fighting particularly well. Weak fighters were the
inf of the 89 Inf Div, but they were successfully
supported by the mortars and inf guns, as well
as by single tks.
(e) All subordinate units fought well, sacrificing
themselves. The losses in proportion to the

Captured Localities: Cramesnil–La Bruyére (8
Aug); Cauvicourt (9 Aug); Robertmesnil (9 Aug);
St. Sylvain (10 Aug); St Martin de Bois (9 Aug);
Soignolles (10 Aug); Estrées la Campagne (10
Aug).

(f) Losses
By 1200 hours 12 Aug 44, the following losses
were recorded:
121 killed (incl 11 offrs)
499 wounded (incl 57 offrs)
36 missing (incl 5 offrs)
Total 656

Soldiers from the 1st Polish Armoured Division talk
with a French civilian walking away with what she
could salvage from her house in Normandy, August
1944.
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Cromwell tanks of the 10th Mounted Rifles, the divisional reconnaissance regiment waiting to advance.

In proportion to the strength of the div, the losses
were not too heavy, but the specialists, chiefly tk
crews, lost are difficult to replace.

whom was Major Von Fischbach, OC 1193 Bty
of Coastal Arty, now 2 i/c of the group), Group
Waldmuller.

(g) Losses of Equipment

Equipment: destroyed or put out of action:

The losses in armour (mostly from direct hits
or set on fire): total number 66. They have been
replaced with the exception of ten tks destroyed.
There are also destroyed 5 A Tk guns SP (4 3-inch and 1 – 17-pdr); 5 6-pdr A Tk guns; 1
25-pdr gun SP and 1 25-pdr gun tractor drawn.

5 – tks Mk IV

(h) The Booty

14 – 15 cm mortars

Up to 12 Aug 44 at 1200 hours, the number of
prisoners taken and recorded in Div HQ was:
4 offrs and 175 ORs. Apart from these nearly
250 prisoners were directed straight to the
British posts. A total of 429 prisoners. Among
the recorded POW were 1 offr and 9 ORs (incl
7 Poles), 85 Inf Div; 67 ORs (incl 4 Poles), 89
Inf Div; 15 prisoners (incl 3 Poles), 272 Inf Div;
3 prisoners, 12 SS Panzer Div; 3 offrs (among

6 – tks Mk V
2 – tks Mk VI
2 – 88 mm guns
7 – 75 mm guns
1 – 105 mm gun
7 – MGs
4 – 22 mm A Tk guns.

(i) I have always maintained that the morale of
the soldiers belonging to 1 Pol Armd Div is good,
but now, after this first period of fighting, I must
stress that the morale of the units, as well as
other services, is even better than very good.
(j) Description of Some Actions
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1 Tk Regt – distinguished itself in the battle for
Rénemesnil on 9 Aug. About 1200 hours the
Regt received a hy arty and mortar fire in the
neighbourhood of the church. In the area of Hill
84 (S Rénemesnil) Tigers appeared, with the sp
of very well working arty. The regt, in an attack,
took Hill 84, but on the S slope was stopped by
very fierce A Tk defence. At 1300 hours CO Regt
decided to attack Hill 111 (along the axis 84
Chemin Hausse). The second sqn captured the
hill. The enemy put up a very hy fire of mortars,
arty, and A Tk guns. In this op the regt suffered
quite hy losses, namely: 3 offr killed (incl the 2
i/c) and 10 ORs; 4 offrs wounded and 11 ORs; 1
off missing and 7 ORs.

The Div passed through their baptism of battle
very well and bravely, and one feels one can rely
on these soldiers.

During the action on Hill 111 the regt freed from
the Germans about 100 Cdn soldiers, who had
been without food and ammunition for two days.
The captured prisoners confessed that the attack
demoralized the enemy inf garrison.

(2) The enemy gained time to recover, not having
been sufficiently neutralized by the arty and Air
Force.

9 Rifle Bn – were exposed in Soignolles to
German fire and counter-attacks. They kept their
ground in spite of several enemy counter-attacks
and notwithstanding losses of 20 killed and
nearly 120 wounded, showed a very high morale.
10 Dragoons – held Estrées la Campagne (SE
outlets) during 11 Aug under a heavy fire of
coupled mortars. In spite of losses and overfatigue morale of this regt was excellent, which I
could personally establish.
The A Tk Regt – all btys competed with each
other in stoutness and bravery as well as in good
firing. The relatively high amt of destroyed or
damaged enemy eqpt is to be attributed chiefly
to their good action.
10 Mounted Rifle Regt – worked all the time
with sacrifice and persistence, demoralizing the
enemy. According to the statements of prisoners,
as a result of this regts action the Germans in
La Bû sur Rouvres suffered losses necessitating
their release by tps from Ernes.
Div HQ, with supply tps and wkshops, fell into the
range of bomber Air Force, probably American,
S of Caen on 8 Aug, which by mistake bombed
this area. In spite of the large accumulation of
arty, Air Force and inf munitions deposited in the
area designated for us, and the explosions which
lasted 40 minutes, and in spite of AA Arty losses,
all endured the fire very praiseworthily and no
missing were reported.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2006

General Remarks:
(1) The op was not executed according to plan
of the Corps Comd, as the 51 (H) Div did not
capture on the first day all their objectives. In
consequence, 1 Pol Armd Div could not by-pass
51 (H) Div and make an adv according to plan just
after the air bombardment of the hill S Estrées
la Campagne 140, but was forced to help 51 (H)
Div in capturing their objectives. The mistakes
of our own Bomber Air Force were the reason.

(3) 1 Pol Armd Div was obliged to execute several
short attacks in succession, typical for inf ops.
It had not the chance to take advantage of an inf
action, which is the proper work of an armd div.
(4) 1 Pol Armd Div fell into the fire of enemy tks
of Tiger type, and into A Tk fire before reaching
so called “Bombline”, where it was brought by
the British Traffic Control, and where it had not
the right of decision.
The op started, however, without any friction,
thanks to valiant action by 2 A Tk Regt and 24
Lancers, which immediately deployed, inflicting
losses on the enemy and forcing him to retreat.
They themselves, however, suffered likewise fairly
considerable losses, especially in offrs and hy
losses in eqpt.
*****
Fighting During the Period
from 12-22 August 1944.
The Closing of the Trun Pocket.
Hill 259 Hordouseaux (3333)
Hill 240 Ecorches (4258)
Hill 252 and 262 Coudehard (4455) (so called
Maczuga – the Mace)
Chambois (4051-4152).

(a) Relief (12 Aug)
(b) Regrouping E of R Laise (14 Aug) and night
fighting for Aisy and Potigny (night of 14-15 Aug)
61
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(c) Race for the crossings, their capture and the
occupation of brheads on the R Dives at Jort and
L’Homme Couliboef (15, 16 Aug)
(d) Assault from brheads against Trun (16 Aug)
(e) Ops for closing of the Trun pocket (night of
16/17 Aug)
(f) Diversion on Les Champeaux (18 Aug)
(g) Capture of Chambois and the Mace (Maczuga).
The estab of contact with Americans at Chambois
and with 4 Cdn Armd Div in the area of Ecorches.
(h) Battle of the Mace (Maczuga) with penetrating
German Armd Corps (18 – 22 Aug).
1. Task of 1 Pol Armd Div
The Div got the task of regrouping itself for the
ops on the crossing of the R Dives.
To attack and capture the crossings on the R
Dives at Jort.
To org the brheads on the R Dives.
To occupy the hills 159 and 259.
To attack and seize Trun.

General Characteristics of the Fighting
1. The Enemy
(a) The enemy is surprised and misled by the
recent ops,
(b) He finds himself in a pocket, which must
be closed,
(c) The strength of the enemy is estimated to
include several of the higher formations, as much
as 50% of armoured units.
(d) The enemy will fight desperately and
valiantly in an attempt to break out of the trap
(particularly the SS and Panzer units).

The decisive Factors of the success of the op were:
(a) The speed of capturing the crossings on the
R Dives.
(b) The strength of the two pincers which should
close the breach
(c) The equality of speed of the Polish div and
their neighbors
(d) The superiority in arty and Air Force
(e) The dry weather (rds)

2. Own Forces
The losses (656 killed, wounded and missing,
as given in the battle-report No.1) have not
influenced the op ability of the div to such a
degree that the task could not be fulfilled.
The spirit of the tps was excellent, the
stubbornness even higher than in the first
phase of the fighting. The supplement of men
were incorporated and the eqpt was replenished
(except 10 Shermans for the regts of 10 Armd Cav
Bde and 2 Cromwells for 10 Mounted Rifle Regt).
The fatigue caused by the fighting was great, but
was forgotten in the pride at the results achieved.
The relief as well as the regrouping E of the R
Laise, was accompanied efficiently and in proper
time.
An unexpected mishap, however, was the second
bombardment by our own Air Force on the
afternoon of 14 Aug, which resulted in 204 cas,
namely: 1 offr, 47 ORs killed, 103 ORs wounded
and 53 ORs missing.
The rigidity of the control of the bombing ops
(from London) made it, as a result, impossible
to stop it when once started. It lasted two hours.
The yellow smoke was of no use, because of the
clouds caused by the first released bombs.
3. The Ground
Features and cover.
Between the R Laise and R Dives – flat and cut
up with many small plantations and bushes.
They made natural camouflage for the enemy.
The armour could be moved only very carefully
and hence very slowly.
To the E of the R Dives, more or less, on the
vertical co-ordinate 30, and in the corridor
of Trun between the woods of de Gouffern (6
kilometres S of Trun) and the wooded expanse
to the E of the river, the ground rises, passing
to outstanding hills with a difference of altitude
running to 100 meters in 3 kilometres.
This ground was rather more difficult for tk
ops than the previous area, but not impossible,
particularly in dry and good weather.
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The ground lying farther to the W was more
wooded and hilly, and not suitable at all for
manoeuvring by larger groups of armour.

(b) Task – to occupy speedily and hold, the
crossings on the R Dives (for 1 Pol Armd Div in
Jort).

The obstacle which it was necessary to master
was the R Dives with important crossings in:
St. Pierre sur Dives (for 51 (H) Div), Jort (for
1 Pol Armd Div), Morteaux–Couliboeuf (for 4
Cdn Armd Div); besides the other obstacles to
the movement of tks, was the N basin of the R.
Dives with a SW direction, namely, Radon Du
Ravin Des Hautes; Radon Rau; R de Neauphie
and R de Fontbec.

To capture the hills 159 and 259 as a basis for the
action to the S, especially on Trun and Chambois.

The following hills comprised the barrier
closing the corridor of Trun; 159 (289365); 259
(332346); the area of hills 137, Hordoseaux and
the region of Ecorches; the hills 250, 240, 252,
262 the area Coudehard (the pommel of the Mace
“Maczuga”); 262 region of Mont Ormel (the stock
of the Mace “Maczuga”).
4. Communications
(a) Enemy – he would try to break through at all
costs under cover of his armour or if no other
possibility, with his armour only.

To attack Trun, take and hold it.
To block the enemy’s retreat from Trun by
capturing and holding the area of hills Horoseaux
258259 and Ecorche 240 and from Chambois, by
capturing and holding the area of hills Coudehard
262, 252 and the hill Mont Ormel 262.
To block the E rd from Chambois (the task of
the other Army).
5. The General Course of Ops
14 August 1944: The regrouping on the E from
the R Laise was carried out by 14 Aug, whilst 10
Dragoons reconnoitred the locality and the woods
of Quesnay, 8 Rifle Bn Aisy and Potigny, and 9
Rifle Bn Fontaine le Pin.
In the night of 14/15 Aug, 9 Rifle Bn, by 2400
hours, had taken Fontaine le Pin and by 0700
63
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hours of 15 Aug, had capture the Hill 206, taking
there 26 prisoners of 85 Inf Div.

During the night, 3 Rifle Bde occupied and
prepared the brheads on the R Dives.

8 Rifle Bn, by 0700 hours, had taken Aisy and
by 0900 hours had captured Potigny, taking also
prisoners.

16 August 1944 – The attack from bridgeheads
to the south.

Simultaneously with the ops of these bns, 24
Lancers shot up and captured three tks, 2
Panthers and 1 Mk IV. Ten prisoners from 12 SS
Panzer Div taken.
15 August 1944 – The race for the crossings
on the R Dives and the capture of the crossings
in Jort.
The div started at 1100 hours in two columns,
getting permission to pass over the highway
Caen–Falaise at two points. Right column on
Rouvres–Sassy–Jort; and the left column on Bout
de Haut–Vendeuvre-Morières.
The whole was preceded by 10 Mounted Rifles,
which reconnoitred the crossings and after their
daring capture, went on to Courcy.
The river was reached and the crossings taken
at night. The enemy defended them furiously in
Jort, especially in the area of the rlwy station and
in a small wood W of the station.

The attack was carried out by 10 Armd Cav
Bde less one tk regt, reinf by 8 Rifle Bn from
Vendeuvre. At that time 3 Rifle Bde less 8 Rifle
Bn held the brheads in Jort (1 Mountain Rifle
Bn) and Morières (9 Rifle Bn) reinforced by 1 Tk
Regt, which reconnoitred in the direction of the
woods of Courcy.
The attack was carried out in two columns: Right
column, 24 Lancers plus 10 Dragoons plus one
A Tk Bty (comd Major Kanski and after he was
wounded Major Zgorzelski) on the way 24-39
L’Homme Coulibeouf–Barou. Left Column, 2 Tk
Regt plus 8 Rifle Bn plus one A Tk Bty on Barou.
The whole Polish Arty SP the attack from the
area of Sassy and the Brit arty from the area N
of Rouvres.
At 2100 hours Barou was captured and the rd
from Morteaux-Coulibeouf–Barou cut. Morteaux
was still in enemy hands, as the Cdn Div did not
manage to take the crossing. Prisoners taken
were from 1053 and 1054 Grenadier Regts.

10 Mounted Rifles, with A Tk bty SP, destroyed in
this action two tks Mk V and captured one tk Mk
V (co-ordinates 222452 and 219449). Moreover,
they destroyed four A Tk guns including two 88
mm (218469, 219449 and 234451). They also
put out of action a six gun tp, taking 5 guns
on the position (one was damaged). Prisoners
numbering 120 were taken from the 272 and
85 Inf Divs.

17 August 1944 – The Op of closing the Trun
Gap.

At Vendeuvre the crossing had been captured by
1745 hours.

10 Armd Cav Bde, which as ordered to attack
the hills 159 and 259, attacked from Barou,
captured Norry-en-Auge, and took 2 offrs and
22 ORs prisoner, of 21 Panzer Div.

3 Rifle Bde was ordered to occupy the bridgeheads
on the R Dives.
10 Mounted Rifle Regt plus one squadron 10
Dragoons plus one A Tk bty SP have the task
of reconnoitring on Courcy–Louvagny. The
whole arty plus one Med Regt RA to support the
formation at the brhead. The Engrs are building
a bridge at Jort, clring minefields, repairing rds
and organizing crossing points.

10 Mounted Rifle Regt plus one A Tk Bty was
withdrawn for the night 16/17 Aug to reserve
and got for 17 Aug the task of reconnoitring in
direction of Trun. By 0930 hours this regt stated
that the enemy columns were moving to the E on
the highway Crocy – Trun.

By 1700 hours the group of Lt.Col. Koszutski (2
Tk Regt, 8 Rifle Bn and 1 A Tk Bty) had taken
the Hill 259 (381346) and the group of Major
Zgorzelksi (24 Lancers and 10 Dragoons) the
hill 310360.
More prisoners were taken, numbering 1 offr
and 84 ORs, from 12 SS Panzer Div, 85 Inf Div
and 271 Inf Div.
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German soldiers being marched into captivity, 16 August 1944.

At 1750 hours the Corps Comd, arrived with the
order of the Army Group Comd to take Chambois
that same night. At that time also Trun was to be
taken by 4 Cdn Armd Div.
Although the tps were extremely exhausted, as 1
Pol Armd Div had been fighting as a frontal wedge
strictly speaking without co-operation of the right
and left forces and bearing the whole burden of
what proved later to be a huge weight, the Div
Comd assigned to Lt.-Col. Koszutski’s group the
task of an immediate stroke at Chambois, which
should have started by 1930 hours. A further
plan of Div Comd was to block the exits from
Chambois by capturing and holding the Hills 262,
252, and 262, Mont Ormel (“Maczuga”).
18 August 1944 – The Diversion of the Group
Comd (Lt.-Col Koszutski).
Unfortunately the intention of the Div Comd
failed. It was thwarted by the Group Comd of 2
Tk Regt. He did not move, but at 0200 hours,
and moreover in the wrong direction, i.e. not
in direction Chambois SE, but in direction les
Champeaux, straight to the E, engaging himself
in a combat with enemy inf and A Tk weapons
in a country very difficult for tks.
In the morning Div Comd got the alarming report
of the threat that 2 Tk Regt and 8 Rifle Bn may be
destroyed. He ordered the comd of 10 Armd Cav
Bde to help the group, which he did, detailing 1
Mountain Rifle Bn.
The Div Comd directed a reconnaissance (10
Mounted Rifle Regt plus two A Tk Btys) on
Chambois, which was reached by 1650 hours
(one kilometre S of Chambois – the first sqn
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of 10 Mtd Rifle Regt) but the regt was forced to
withdraw 1 kilometre further S in view of the
bombardment by our own Air Force.
Leading elements of 10 Armd Cav Bde (10
Dragoons plus 24 Lancers) reached the area
333326 at 2030 hours and were engaged in
hy fighting with enemy inf and A Tk weapons.
Meanwhile, the 1 Mounted Rifle Bn have not
found 2 Tk Regt in the area of Les Champeaux.
The latter at this time was in the area of 428586,
and asserted that they could not move farther
because of shortage of supplies (part of their
transport with amn and petrol was destroyed by
our own Air Force).
Owing to incorrect reports, the supplies which
had been sent by the QM to the area of Bourdon
(allegedly occupied by 2 Tk Regt) could not reach
them, as the area was held by the enemy and 2
Tk Regt occupied it only temporarily.
In these extremely hard conditions began the
crisis of the battle, which lasted until midday of
21 Aug. It was caused by:
(a) Desperate efforts of German forces, which
found themselves in the gap Trun–Chambois–
Coudehard–Ecorches to break through at all
costs.
(b) Co-operation of the German forces attacking
from the NE with the aim of enabling the escape
of German tps trapped in the gap.
(c) Relatively small force – 1 Pol Armd Div – for
the closing of the gap, as the neighbouring forces
did not co-operate sufficiently.
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(d) Cutting off the supply echelons from the
fighting units, which greatly complicated the
question of supplies of amn and petrol and the
evacuation of wounded.
The Capture of Chambois and Maczuga – The
Fighting for Maczuga with German Forces,
trying to Break Through.
In this critical situation 10 Armd Cav Bde
Comd, ordered 1 Tk Regt to attack in direction
of Bourdon, to enable the supply of Lt.-Col.
Koszutski’s group. But again this attack could
not be executed as the Allied Air Force made
it impossible by shelling the area. The night
of 18/19 passed with the situation unclear
concerning the neighbouring forces in Trun.
According to information received, 4 Cdn Armd
Div should have taken Trun by 0930 hours, but
it was not definitely captured until 1315 hours,
advancing only slightly in the direction of St.
Lambert. The left neighbour, 3 Cdn Inf Div, was
relieving 51 (H) Div, which op from St. Pierresur-Dives in direction E.
19 August 1944: The task for the day of 19
Aug was to attack and capture Chambois and
“Maczuga”. At 0920 hours the group of Major
Zgorzelski – 10 Dragoons plus 24 Lancers
attacked the Hill 137 (420555). At 1200 hours
after throwing out the German inf, 24 Lancers

captured the Hill 137, taking a great number of
prisoners.
10 Dragoons had consolidated on Hill 137 at
1437 hours.
24 Lancers adv on the Hill 424544 very slowly,
owing to the difficult country.
By 1539 hours 1 Tk Regt reported that with all
their forces, they had taken the area of Coudehard
and fought heavily with Panthers, being at the
same time subjected to a strong enemy arty fire.
24 Lancers continued to attack to the S (generally
on Frenes) losing contact with 10 Dragoons,
which, advancing, operated on Chambois.
At this time 10 Mounted Rifle Regt plus two A
Tk Btys SP, which had been acting very efficiently
as div recce since the morning in direction of
Chambois, linked up with Major Zgorzelski’s
group (10 Dragoons).
By 1930 hours 10 Dragoons had captured the
S outskirts of Chambois, and in heavy handto-hand battles in the suburbs of Chambois,
captured the whole place, occupying the highway
exits in the direction of Mont Ormel, and in the
direction of St. Lambert-sur-Dives linking up
with American inf.
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The regrouping of the units for the night
according to orders was not accomplished, as
the group of Lt.-Col. Koszutski had not adv SE,
but remained where they were.
The disposal was as follows:
The group of Lt.-Col. Koszutski (2 Tk Regt plus
8 Rifle Bn plus one A Tk Bty) – the Hill 240.
1 Tk Regt plus 1 Mountain Rifle Bn plus one A
Tk Bty – the hills 262 and 252 (“Maczuga”)
24 Lancers – 1 kilometre E of 113 (4152)
10 Dragoons – Chambois
10 Mounted Rifle Regt – 1 kilometre N of
Chambois
9 Rifle Bn – in march from 240 on Maczuga.

The whole burden of the battle this day, with a
superior enemy, (as it was disclosed later units of
the 1 and 2 SS Corps) was borne by 1 Pol Armd
Div, which outstripped their neighbouring forces
in a wedge 6 -7 kilometres SE.
20 August 1944: During the night of 19/20
Aug, the 10 Mounted Rifle Regt fought very
courageously with the enemy, who was trying
to slip out of the trap, attacked several times at
night.
The battle reached its climax when the Comd of a
German higher formation, Lt.-Gen. Elfeld, trying
to break through under the cover of Panthers,
was taken prisoner with all his staff. At this
moment the gallant Comd of 10 Mounted Rifle
Regt – Major Maciejowski – was killed.

During the whole day the enemy attacked the
1 and 2 Tk Regts from all sides. The attacks
followed from the W from the gap where the
German forces were trapped, as well as from
the E, where probably the 21 Panzer Div, with
their battlegroups tried to release the trapped
German forces. The battle closed at a distance
of 50 metres and the best proof of its fury will
be evident later in the battlefield Chambois–
Maczuga.
In the area of Bourdon an enemy tk group
encountered the HQ of 10 Armd Cav Bde, but
was completely destroyed. The Adv HQ of the
Comd 10 Armd Cav Bde was moved to Hill 259.
The question of supplies for cut-off regts became
a big problem, which the blocked roads and
enemy roaming all over the gap made it difficult
to solve.
The supply of amn and fuel by means of air
transport was in preparation, but could be
carried out only on the morning of 21 Aug.
An equally big question was the evacuation of
wounded and prisoners. There was a lack of
tracked vehicles able to move over all parts of
the ground.
The crisis was mastered. The units repelled the
German attack and held the designated posns
though no help came from 4 Cdn Armd Div,
which next day only attacked from Hill 240 in the
S direction, and helped in supplying our units.

Cromwells of 1st Polish Armoured Division
on the move in Normandy, August 1944.
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Strong attacks were launched on 24 Lancers from
the direction of St. Lambert-sur-Dives and later
on 10 Dragoons in the S outskirts of Chambois.
It turned out that St. Lambert-sur-Dives was held
by the enemy, and not by part of 4 Cdn Armd Div
as was ordered.

The area – Mont Ormel, 262, Chambois

24 Lancers co-ordinated its action with 10
Dragoons by 0815 hours and counter-attacked,
thus forcing the enemy to withdraw. At this time
the Americans were approaching from the SW.

The task – Defence of the area held in the
direction of E and N and linking up and holding
contact with the 4 Cdn Armd Div in St Lambert
sur Dives and with American tps S of Frenes.

The enemy renewed his attacks and the battle
raged the whole day, the enemy suffering hy
losses in eqpt. In the evening the attack declined
and Major Agorzelski’s group was supplied by
the Americans with fuel and amn. The wounded
were conveyed by this group to the Americans.

The whole arty from the area of Bourdon to
support either group.

21 August 1944: The enemy still tried to
break through in different directions, but it was
obvious that the crisis had passed. There were
no organized actions, but only isolated efforts by
separate groups.

One Engr Coy and one sqn of 10 Mounted Rifle
Regt (tempy) to protect Adv Div HQ (Hill 159).
Second Engr Coy to sweep the mines, repair the
roads and organize the crossings.

By 1045 hours the Canadians had linked up
with 2 Tk Regt, and in the afternoon a whole Cdn
Bde arrived in the area of 262 Maczuga, bringing
supplies for the armd regts. The crisis was over.

In the evening 22 Aug with a commendation
for the action by the Cdn Army Comd, General
Crerar, arrived an order of change for the div,
which on the day 23 Aug at 1700 hours passed
over to the res of Army Comd.

At 2000 hours the order for regrouping was
received. It was carried out during the day of
22 Aug.
22 August 1944: On this day the div Comd got
the disposal which he had planned for 1500
hours on the 19 Aug. The disposal is as follows:
The Group of the Comd 3 Rifle Bde:
Composition:
8 and 9 Rifle Bns.
2 Tk Regt.
One A Tk Bty
One Sqn MG.

The area – 262, 252, Coudehard
The task – the defence of area from E and W.
The Group of the Comd 10 Armd Cav Bde:
Composition:
1 Tk Regt
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24 Lancers
1 Mountain Rifle Bn
10 Dragoons
One A Tk Bty

10 Mounted Rifle Regt less one sqn plus two A
Tk Btys in the area 1 kilometre N of Chambois
to be a reserve of Div Comd.

General Characteristics of the Ops
The regrouping of 1 Pol Armd Div on the day of
13 Aug, aimed at their operational employment
in harrying the deep rear of the retreating enemy.
The first condition to be fulfilled was the quick
seizure of crossings over the R Dives. By excellent
fighting of 10 Mounted Rifle Regt (with one A Tk
Bty and one sqn of 10 Dragoons) the crossings
were seized on 16 Aug at Jort and in the morning
of 17 Aug S of Jort.
Through these crossings the div attacked quickly
at the designated objectives – the Hills 159 and
259, and by the afternoon at 1700 hours they
had already completed their task.
At 1750 hours the Div Comd received personally,
from the Corps Comd an order from the Army
Group Comd to attack and seize Chambois that
same night. At that time also 4 Cdn Armd Div
was to attack Trun.
The task of attacking Chambois was given to
Lt.-Col. Koszutski’s group (2 Tk Regt, 8 Rifle Bn
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and one A Tk Bty), but unfortunately they did
not reach their destinations, but went astray and
engaged themselves in battle at les Champeaux.
The leading plan of the Div Comd had been to
seize Chambois and to bar the E exits by capture
of the Hills 262 – 252 (Maczuga) and 262 (S of
Mont Ormel).
As he was not able to get this done by Lt.-Col.
Koszutski’s group, the Div Comd assigned the
capture of Chambois to Major Zgorzelski’s
group (10 Dragoons, 24 Lancers) with which
were joined 10 Mounted Rifle Regt. This regt
reconnoitring Chambois early was there engaged
in battle.
The days of 13-20 and the morning of the 21 Aug,
saw hy fighting full of glorious deeds of the div
against German elite tps, namely two SS corps,
which tried to break through at any cost.
The greatness of the victory can be measured by
a review of the battlefields at Chambois, Mont
Ormel and the Hills 262 and 252, showing the
triumph of the Polish arms.

Remarks. The captured eqpt was recorded at
co-ordinates and gives the result of the last
three days of the battle (18-21 Aug). The amt
of capture eqpt is however much larger, but as
the co-ordinates were not given in the reports of
the other units they were disregarded. It can be
estimated that the same amt of eqpt was capture
in the period 14-18 Aug.
Own Losses
325 killed (incl 21 offr)
1002 wounded (incl 35 offr)
114 missing (incl 00 offr)

Total losses 1,441, with previous 657, total
2,097, from which: 446 killed (incl 37 offrs),
150 wounded (incl 92 offrs) and 150 missing
(incl 5 offrs).
The div obtained during the op the written
appreciation of Cdn Army Comd, General Crerar,
and 2 Cdn Corps Comd, General Simonds.

The div went through several trials during this op,
and came out fully victorious. The direct rewards
were the prisoners and booty as follows:
Prisoners Recorded: up to 23 Aug. – 87 Offrs
(incl: 1 Lt.-Gen, 4 Cols, 2 Lt.-Cols.) and 3,576
ORs. Unrecorded: handed over to the Americans
without receipt when Major Zgorzelski’s group
was cut off from the div: - 50 offrs and 1,400 ORs,
handed over by 24 Lancers and 10 Dragoons.
Total: over 5,000 prisoners.
Booty: Captured and destroyed eqpt – 55 tks
and armoured vehs, (incl 14 Panthers, 6 Tigers,
12 Mk IV, 5 Mk III, 2 Mk II), 2 guns SP (88 mm),
14 armoured cars, 44 guns (various types), 38
Armoured tracked vehs for tp transport, 207
Motor vehs, 152 horse-drawn vehicles.

The editors wish to thank John R. Grodzinski
for his assistance with this feature.
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